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INTRODUCTION
Adult begging in Italy has been decriminalized since a Constitutional Court decision in 19951 and an ensuing law, no. 205, in 1999.
*

Alessandro Simoni is a professor of comparative law at the University of Florence, School of Law,
and a member of the Florence Bar. Giacomo Pailli, Ph.D. (Florence 2013), LL.M. (NYU 2011), is a
research fellow at the University of Florence, School of Law, and a member of the Florence and
New York Bar. This paper was presented at the conference on “Poverty Law: Academic Activism”
at the Seattle University School of Law on February 19–20, 2016. The authors thank the organizers
and the participants for their useful comments, but retain responsibility for any omission or imprecision. The authors further gratefully acknowledge the generous support of Open Society Foundations,
as well as the involvement and support of the European Roma Rights Centre in the case presented.
The authors also wish to thank Dr. Sabrina Tosi Cambini for reviewing a number of sections and
providing anthropological expertise during the work of the team in general.
Although this contribution is a joint work, Parts I and II are specifically attributable to Alessandro Simoni and Parts III and IV are specifically attributable to Giacomo Pailli.
DISCLOSURE: Alessandro Simoni and Giacomo Pailli are representing the plaintiffs in the
pending case described in this Article. The opinions expressed within this Article are those of the
authors only.
1. Corte Costituzionale [Corte Cost.], 28 dicembre 1995, n. 519, Racc. uff. corte cost., available at http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/1995/0519s-95.htm.
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Nonetheless, beggars, particularly Roma ones,2 are still perceived by the
public as a nuisance, like an issue that should be dealt with.
Sensible to the pressure of its constituency, even Florence—a city
with a tradition of openness and inclusion—has taken measures against
begging and other similar street-level economic activities. Between 2007
and 2008, the first wave of city action in Florence was directed at windshield cleaners at traffic lights. Even though the policy was challenged, it
produced the intended effect of removing such beggars from their posts.
Today, a second wave of city action, visible since 2013 and based on a
very loose municipal regulation, has taken the form of routine de facto
pressure exerted by local police on beggars that aims to remove beggars
from the touristic city center.
Amid the difficulties of targeting behaviors or administrative regulations rather than a law, a small team from the Law School at the University of Florence has decided to take action. The legal actions against
the local administration are part of a broader “action research” on the
current state of the Italian legal system with regard to the protection of
the fundamental rights of specific underprivileged groups (primarily
Roma immigrants of Romanian citizenship). These groups have been
constantly targeted by the media and a number of political actors, and labeled as the ultimate danger to Italian society.
On the one side, the project seeks to understand how local municipalities are overcoming legal obstacles posed by national laws and the
2. With the umbrella term “Roma,” we refer to the members of a number of very diverse
groups who historically have lived in Europe and are usually considered as sharing a specific ethnic
identity that altogether constitute the largest minority in the continent. Because of its widespread use,
and in line with a politically correct practice, the term Rom/Roma today tends to replace the general
term of Gypsy/Gypsies in the official documents in English. Roma have been for centuries the object
of discrimination and persecution and, in recent times, stereotyping and stigmatization dominates. A
huge linguistic and cultural variety exists within the Roma community, the boundaries of which are
not clearly defined. In this specific context the authors (particularly when it comes to the parties of
the currently pending cases) do not assume any specific content of Roma identity, nor did they find it
relevant to specify to which specific Roma group the beggars targeted by local policies are likely to
pertain. When speaking about “Roma” we simply mean persons that either claim to be Roma, or are
classified as Roma/Gypsies/Nomads (Rom, zingari, nomadi in Italian) in the actual practice of law
enforcement authorities. For a standard historical treatment, see generally ANGUS FRASER, THE
GYPSIES (2d ed. 1995), and LEONARDO PIASERE, ROMS: UNE HISTOIRE EUROPÉENNE (Viviane Dutaut trans., 2011). With regard to the links between views on Roma ethnic identity and persecution,
see generally LEO LUCASSEN, WIM WILLEMS & ANNEMARIE COTTAAR, GYPSIES AND OTHER
ITINERANT GROUPS: A SOCIO-HISTORICAL APPROACH (1998). For a view on Roma discrimination
specific to European legal culture, see Alessandro Simoni, Roma and Legal Culture: Roots and Old
and New Faces of a Complex Equality Issue, EUR. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION L. REV., Dec. 2011, at 11.
For an analysis of the documents produced by public institutions in Europe related to the settlement
and housing conditions of Roma, see generally WOR(L)DS WHICH EXCLUDE: THE HOUSING ISSUE OF
ROMA, GYPSIES AND TRAVELLERS IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE ACTS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
DOCUMENTS IN EUROPE (Leonardo Piasere, Nicola Solimano & Sabrina Tosi Cambini eds., 2014).
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Constitution by replacing legal norms with a factual police pressure
against marginalized people and Roma beggars in particular. On the other side, the team has begun to challenge these policies both
extrajudicially and before a court of law—an uncommon undertaking in
a country with a limited tradition of public interest litigation involving
academics.
The legal action started by this group of academics aimed to challenge a potentially illegal database of beggars, which was allegedly
maintained by the Florence local police. The group also plans to target
the local police practice of repeatedly issuing fines to beggars for “annoying” begging and will challenge the loose municipal regulation upon
which such practice is supposedly based. Although the litigation is still
ongoing, the Florence experience already provides empirical evidence
for a view of the Italian legal system where the effectiveness of fundamental rights for specific groups appears hampered by technical loopholes in the procedural system; loopholes which, in turn, make judicial
review of local regulations and local police action difficult.
In the following pages we will first present the historical background of the matter, from the nineteenth-century criminal approach to
the decriminalization of adult begging under the pressure of the Italian
Constitutional Court in the 1990s. Second, we turn to the local municipalities’ reaction to this change and explain how they tried to fill the
space with a number of administrative measures—whose legitimacy may
often still be questioned. Third, we focus on the experience of Florence
by describing the mayor’s failed ordinances and the Regulation on Urban
Police adopted in 2008 and currently in force. Finally, we present our
ongoing work: specifically, the pending action against the alleged “database of beggars” and the activity against the potentially discriminatory
police practice of fining beggars. In both cases, we will highlight how the
Italian procedural system and culture seems to not support this kind of
experimental public interest litigation.
I. THE PATH TO THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF ADULT BEGGING
Since the early days of Italy’s existence as a unified state, the criminal law legislation in force contained harsh provisions against beggars
(mendicanti). In doing so, the newborn Italian legal system simply followed a preexisting line well-established in Continental Europe, as the
machinery for the control of the urban poor developed before the French
Revolution was received and replicated in the context of the new codifi-
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cation of criminal law.3 The “Sardinian” criminal code of 1859, extended
in 1865 to the whole of the Kingdom of Italy, was still influenced by the
French, and established that any “able-bodied and usual” (valido e abituale) beggar was subject to imprisonment, although with somewhat more
lenient treatment than what occurred in France.4 Being a beggar implied,
moreover, a more serious punishment when other specific crimes were
committed. However, from the beginning, this clear-cut “law in the
books” was not accompanied by a significant level of actual enforcement. In the first legal encyclopedia of Italy, one can read a lengthy
complaint about “the scarce respect of the law and regulations about
begging,”5 which was seen as the root cause of a long line of problems
ranging from public health to the negative impact on foreigners visiting
the country that were “coming among us to admire the beauties of art and
nature, [but] run[ning] away disgusted by the impunity of begging.”6
This old passage well anticipates and summarizes the main lines of
the situation in the following hundred years, with theoretical criminal
sanction, scarce enforcement, and a strong perception that the main problem related to beggars is not their situation and state of need, but rather,
their negative impact on the “visual landscape.” The new criminal code
of 1889 (the “Zanardelli code”) also kept the French approach until the
legislative landscape was eventually stabilized during Fascist times with
the criminal code of 1930, which is still in force (the so-called “Rocco
code,” from the name of Mussolini’s Minister of Justice).7 The “Rocco
code” innovated the French legislative technique by setting aside the relevance of whether a beggar was “able-bodied.” The relevant provision in
the new criminal code (Article 670) simply stated:
Whoever begs in a public place or in a place open to the public shall
be punished with imprisonment up to three months. The penalty is
imprisonment between one and six months if the fact is committed
in a disgusting or harassing way [ripugnante o vessatorio], or by
faking deformity or disease, or using other fraudulent means to
arouse the pity of others.8

3. On foreign models in the codification of Italian criminal law see ALBERTO CADOPPI,
INTRODUZIONE ALLO STUDIO DEL DIRITTO PENALE COMPARATO 60 (2d ed. 2004).
4. For a review of issues concerning begging in the history of Italian criminal law, see Alessandro Simoni, La mendicità, gli zingari e la cultura giuridica italiana: uno schizzo di tappe e
problemi, 3 POLIS: RICERCHE E STUDI SU SOCIETÀ E POLITICA IN ITALIA 371 (2000).
5. Alberto Errera, Accattonaggio, in 1 ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA ITALIANA 164–65 (1884).
6. Id.
7. See Regio Decreto 19 ottobre 1930, n. 1398 (It.).
8. Codice penale [C.p.] art. 670 (It.) (translation from Italian).
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A further provision established a separate crime of “exploitation of
minors in begging.”9 Severely criminalizing begging was clearly in line
with Fascist political and social orientations, but the previous concern for
the “visual landscape” remained, as we can see in the statements about
the rationale of punishing beggars of the leading criminal law scholars of
that time. We can thus read in a standard treatise of the late 1930s that
“the State must not tolerate the scandal of begging, that can be judged,
particularly by foreigners, as an indicator of insufficient social welfare,
and thus of backward civilization.”10
But also, during the Fascist era, criminal law was not a tool frequently used against beggars, and there were few court cases where the
criminal code was actually enforced. This was not due to a policy of tolerance, but rather because there were more effective means to control
and reduce the number of beggars where their presence in a specific town
or area was perceived as no longer acceptable. Criminal law was only
one of the components of the complex legal machinery used for controlling specific social groups.11 Indeed, Fascist lawmakers did not reform
only the criminal code; rather, they strengthened the instruments contained in the “police laws” (leggi di polizia), which were aimed at crime
prevention on the basis of a discretionary assessment of the danger represented by an individual. The new police law (Testo unico di pubblica
sicurezza – Consolidated act on public security) of 1931 contained a variety of provisions of this kind. For example, the law vested the police
with the authority to issue injunctions banning persons deemed “dangerous for public order and security or public morality”12 from certain areas
or imposing certain obligations on persons “designated by the public
voice as socially dangerous.”13 Police legislation at the time was extremely important in terms of social control, and has been described by a
modern scholar as an “actual criminal law sub-system.”14 This, however,
did nothing more than refine and develop an approach that was already
well-affirmed in pre-Fascist Italy, where the previous police law contained a chapter devoted to “Provisions concerning the dangerous classes
of society” and a number of provisions for the control of vagrancy.

9. Id. art. 671.
10. See 9 VINCENZO MANZINI, TRATTATO DI DIRITTO PENALE ITALIANO, PARTE SECONDA 267
(1939).
11. To put the legal development in context, see generally DAVID FORGACS, ITALY’S
MARGINS: SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND NATION FORMATION SINCE 1861 (2014).
12. Art. 157 of the 1931 police law.
13. Art. 164 and 170 of the 1931 police law.
14. LUIGI FERRAJOLI, DIRITTO E RAGIONE. TEORIA DEL GARANTISMO PENALE 796 (2d ed.
1990).
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In such a legal context, the pressure of the institutions against begbeggars was understandably based on the use of these flexible police
rules rather than on the cumbersome process of prosecution and criminal
adjudication. The “keeping at a distance” of beggars and other urban
marginalized persons took place without raising any major public debate
and only minimally attracted the attention of legal scholars.15
The transition from the Fascist regime to the legal system based on
the 1948 Constitution of the newly born Republic of Italy did not bring
any sudden change in the legal condition of beggars, because all the
legislation mentioned above remained in force. Additionally, in post-war
Italy, judicial decisions applying the criminal code rules about the
begging of adults remained quite rare. With the social and economic
advancement of the country, and the new constitutional framework, one
can, however, observe the core legal issue slowly coming to the surface.
In the late 1950s, the newly established Constitutional Court was first
called on to assess whether Article 670 of the 1930 criminal code was in
line with the new “higher law”—the 1948 Constitution.16 In a first, and
very short, decision issued in 1959, the Constitutional judge was called
on to decide a very specific point, i.e. the compatibility of the criminal
sanction against begging (Article 670) with the provision of the
Constitution (Article 38) stating that “private assistance [as opposed to
public welfare] is free.”17 In the Court’s view the values protected by the
two provisions were different: respectively, the Constitution’s right of
coexistence between private and public welfare and the criminal code’s

15. Since the early twentieth century, an open debate about the use of criminal justice to control individuals perceived as dangerous was less likely due to the dismissal of the positivist criminology previously advocated by Cesare Lombroso and Andrea Ferri. From then on, Italian criminal
law thinking becomes increasingly formalistic and technical, with very little attention to the social
and anthropological context in which crime generates. For a description of such transformation in
the light of the policies against Gypsies, see Alessandro Simoni, Il ‘problema di una gente vagabonda’. Retrospettiva sulla percezione degli zingari nella cultura giuridica italiana, in LA
CONDIZIONE GIURIDICA DI ROM E SINTI IN ITALIA 225 (P. Bonetti, A. Simoni & T. Vitale eds.,
2011).
16. On the Italian Constitutional Court and the many differences from the U.S. Supreme Court,
see generally VITTORIA BARSOTTI, PAOLO G. CAROZZA, MARTA CARTABIA & ANDREA SIMONCINI,
ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN GLOBAL CONTEXT (2015); Giovanni Cassandro, The Constitutional Court of Italy, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1959), and William J. Nardini, Passive Activism and the
Limits of Judicial Self-Restraint: Lessons for America from the Italian Constitutional Court, 30
SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1999). Basically, when a law is necessary to adjudicate a pending case but it
appears to be in contrast with the Italian Constitution, and such conflict cannot be solved by way of
interpretation, judges are required to raise the issue before the Constitutional Court. If the Constitutional Court finds that the challenge is grounds for relief, it may strike down the unconstitutional law
with erga omnes and ex tunc effects.
17. Corte Costituzionale [Corte Cost.], 21 novembre 1959, n. 51, Racc. uff. corte cost., available at http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/1959/0051s-59.html (It.) (translated from Italian).
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“protection of public peace, with some reflection on public order.”18
Hence, the Court found no direct or indirect conflict between Article 670
of the criminal code and the Constitution.19
The provision of the code criminalizing begging again came under
the scrutiny of the Constitutional Court in the 1970s, this time with a
more extensive test. Two trial judges raised the issue before the Court of
whether the criminal sanction of beggars was compatible with Article 2
of the Constitution, establishing the right to the free development of the
personality of the individual and the protection of fundamental rights and
with Article 3 sanctioning the right to equality. According to the judges
who made the referral to the Court, the criminal law provisions were
clearly aimed at the discriminatory treatment of weaker and marginalized
social groups (the list made by one of the judges included “gypsies,
beatniks, [and the] unemployed”), and to repress alternative lifestyles.
Article 670 similarly survived this attack. In 1975, the Court decided that
the criminal offence was not in conflict with the Constitution and that the
“citizen who does not have a work has not per se a right to publicly ask
someone else to support him.”20
After this decision, from the perspective of constitutional
challenges, Article 670 enjoyed twenty years of quiet life. In this
timespan, enforcement remained generally low, although a slight
increase in the number of cases brought to court can be observed. At a
time when begging was still not part of the political and public discourse,
this could be explained in several ways. Likely it was a sort of
“compensation effect” linked to changes in other parts of the legal
system. Most notably, it may be the consequence of the gradual abolition
of the sections of police legislation that were in striking conflict with due
process guarantees. In the absence of other means of “legal pressure” on
marginal persons on the street, prosecution for begging might have
served as a useful second option.21
This limited revival of criminally sanctioning adults for begging
eventually came to its demise in 1995 when the Constitutional Court
partially overruled its 1975 decision, finding that under a
“reasonableness” test, “public peace and public order do not appear to be
seriously put into danger by begging in the form of a simple request for

18. Id. (translated from Italian).
19. Id.
20. Corte Costituzionale [Corte Cost.], 7 maggio 1975, n. 102, Racc. uff. corte cost., available
at http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/1975/0102s-75 (It.).
21. As it is explained extensively in Simoni, supra note 4, there are reasons to believe that persons of Roma ethnicity were the primary targets of the selective enforcement of the criminal code
rules about begging in the years before 1995.
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help.”22 As a consequence of this decision, the first section of Article 670
was removed from the criminal code. The Court, however, opted to keep,
as a separate crime, the conduct described in the second section of the
same article, begging made “in a disgusting or harassing way,” which
was formerly an aggravating circumstance. In the Court’s view, this
provision was aimed at protecting well-deserving values, such as the
“spontaneous fulfillment of the duty of solidarity.”23
Legal scholars and the general public paid little to no attention to
this decision. Regardless, the autonomous crime of “harassing or
disgusting begging,” commonly defined as “intruding begging”
(mendicità invasiva), did not have a long life. In 1999, while approving
an “omnibus law” aimed at the abolition of a number of petty crimes,24
Section 2 of Article 670 was finally abolished with bipartisan support,
and without introducing any administrative sanction. Thus, adult
begging25 was definitively brought into the realm of irrelevance from the
point of view of criminal law.26
II. BEGGING AS A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ISSUE AND THE SHIFT TO
LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROHIBITIONS: THE CASE OF THE CITY OF
FLORENCE
It is crucial to note that the demise of the criminal prohibition of
adult begging took place in a time when begging was not a topic that
raised any major debate at the national political level. This does not
mean that beggars were not present in Italy. Indeed, beggars were active,
particularly in urban areas, and came from a variety of backgrounds.
Homeless persons with a history of alcohol abuse or mental health
problems were certainly part of the “begging community,” although in
Italy, one should not take the correspondence between “homeless” and
“beggar” for granted. Additionally, a portion of the beggars represented
groups of Italians or foreign citizens that practice certain forms of spatial
mobility corresponding to the idea of “vagrant,” who sometimes
practiced economic activities like music or street art. Yet, already in the
22. Corte Costituzionale [Corte Cost.], 28 dicembre 1995, n. 519, Racc. uff. corte cost., available at http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/1995/0519s-95.htm (It.) (translated from Italian).
23. Id.
24. Legge 25 giugno 1999, n. 205, art. 18 (It.).
25. The crime of the exploitation of begging of minors has a different history, and, in recent
times, different legislative changes have been introduced with increasingly severe sanctions. With
regard to the key policy issues, see Alessandro Simoni, La qualificazione giuridica della mendicità
dei minori rom tra diritto e politica, DIRITTO, IMMIGRAZIONE E CITTADINANZA, 2009(1), at 99.
26. Art. 671 of the Italian criminal code on begging by minors has been later on abolished, and
replaced by a new provision in a different part of the criminal code (art. 600), with harsher sanctions.
See Legge 15 luglio 2009, no. 94 (It.).
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early phase of the legal developments just described, persons of Roma
ethnicity represented a very relevant part of beggars on the streets.
We will not deal here with the issue of whether or not begging is
part of the “Roma culture,” which is a debate that has very limited value
in our view,27 and, inter alia, reflects the uncertainties about the actual
existence of a “Roma ethnic identity.” However, what is important in the
context of this analysis of the legal reactions to begging in Italy is the
shift in the features and visibility of the Roma presence in major urban
centers. Roma beggars have always been present in Italy and, until the
1990s, included primarily members of groups that had been settled in
Italy for centuries as well as immigrants from former Yugoslavia, who
arrived in different waves since the 1970s.
The geopolitical changes of the 1990s instead produced a relevant
mobility from Romania, a country with an important Roma minority that
made emigration very difficult during socialist times. The actual
dimensions of this Roma migration flow are difficult to estimate,28 and
figures tend to be inflated for political reasons. This is also linked to the
fact that the Roma migration from Romania to Italy takes place within a
broader migration flow between the two countries (Romanians are by
and large the largest group of foreign residents in Italy),29 which does
not, of course, include only Roma.30 Moreover, there is reason to believe
27. For an anthropological view on begging, see Sabrina Tosi Cambini, Sulla mendicità oggi
nelle città europee occidentali, in MENDICITÀ E STATO DI DIRITTO, RIFLESSIONI ED ESPERIENZE
[PROVISIONAL TITLE] (Alessandro Simoni & Giacomo Pailli eds., forthcoming 2016). On begging by
Roma, see Leonardo Piasere, Antropologia sociale e storica della mendicità zingara, 14 POLIS:
RICERCHE E STUDI SU SOCIETÀ E POLITICA IN ITALIA 409–28 (2000). See also M.O. Jelili, StreetBegging in Cities: Cultural, Political and Socio-Economic Questions, 13 GLOBAL J. HUM. SOC. SCI.
SOCIOLOGY & CULTURE 53–58 (2013).
28. The Italian research team of the EU-funded MigRom Project mapped out a detailed layout
of the presence of Romanian Roma in Italy. According to the results of this preliminary stage of the
research (data collected from April 2013 to January 2014), the team has estimated that at least
20,000 Roma migrated from Romania to Italy. “Due to the many difficulties in gathering data about
Roma in general, and about Romanian Roma in particular, these data are most certainly incomplete
and underestimated. However, they do offer important insights into the presence of these people in
Italy.” MIGROM12: REPORT ON THE PILOT SURVEY 2 (Stefania Pontrandolfo et al. eds., 2014),
available at http://profs.formazione.univr.it/creaa/files/2014/05/Report-on-the-Pilot-Survey_
University-of-Verona1.pdf; see also Marianna Agoni, Rom romeni in Italia: un quadro delle
presenze, in 6 ITALIA ROMANÍ (Stefania Pontrandolfo & Leonardo Piasere eds., 2016).
29. According to a national database, Romanian citizens are around 22.5% of the total number
of foreign citizens living in Italy (in 2014, some 1,131,000 of a total of 5,014,000 foreign citizens).
See Data of the National Institute of Statistics of Italy, http://demo.istat.it/str2014/index.html (last
accessed Mar. 15, 2016).
30. About the life conditions, patterns of migration, experiences, motivations, and ambitions of
Roma migrants from Romania to Italy, see Catalina Tesar, Tra Torino e la Moldavia, in (ROM)ENI
TRA L’ITALIA E TERRITORI DI PARTENZA. VITA QUOTIDIANA, RAPPRESENTAZIONI E POLITICHE
PUBBLICHE (2011); MIGROM: REPORT ON THE FOLLOW UP SURVEY (Stefania Pontrandolfo et al.
eds., 2016).
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that a huge number of Romanian citizens living in Italy, who could be
considered Roma in “ethnic” terms, do not expose their ethnicity, which
is often not so clear-cut.
Whatever their actual number, Romanian Roma beggars acquired
an increased visibility in major urban centers due to their different
begging techniques and clothing styles, which differed from the lower
profiles kept by the Roma from former Yugoslavia. The sudden
explosion of Roma visibility, linked to this “new style” of begging, had
political consequences. At the national level, a right wing government
introduced, in 2008, a package of “decrees on the nomad emergency”31
that caused outrage in the international community. At the local level,
policies against Roma and beggars cut across the political divide, with a
broad consensus about minimizing as much as possible, the presence of
Roma, now a group of “urban outcasts” regularly targeted by policing
activities. While previously beggars were considered illegal immigrants
and the legal tools for their removal could be easily found in immigration
law, in the case of the Romanians, these possibilities were and are
practically very limited because Romania is a EU member state.32 This
implied that efforts were to be made to find an alternative formal legal
basis to “put pressure” on beggars to reduce their numbers and hopefully
convince them to move to other towns—even at the expense of due
process and rule of law standards.
The visibility of Roma beggars caused the mayors of major towns
(a position that in Italy is increasingly used as springboard for a political
career at the national level) and of all political affiliations to react to the
requests made by their constituencies and the local media and take some
sort of action. Considering the disappearance of criminal law
provisions—and, in any case, the absence of a mayor’s power to direct
the action of the national police33—many mayors tried to exploit the
outer limits of the tools available to Italian municipalities in the current
legal system. An interesting example, which occupied the headlines of
the national newspapers for a significant time, is that of Florence, a city
with a world-class historical heritage and a stable left-wing orientation in
31. See Alessandro Simoni, I decreti “emergenza nomadi”: il nuovo volto di un vecchio problema, DIRITTO IMMIGRAZIONE E CITTADINANZA, 2008(3–4), at 44.
32. Citizens of Member States of the European Union enjoy the freedom of movement between
Member States, subject to very limited exceptions. See Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union arts. 49–55, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47. See generally Sergio Carrera,
What Does Free Movement Mean in Theory and Practice in an Enlarged EU?, 11 EUR. L.J. 699
(2005).
33. In Italy, the national police derive from various Ministries: the police from the Interiors, the
Carabinieri from the Defense, and the Guardia di Finanza from the Treasury. The Mayor has no
control over them, but has control over the local police, which in turn has limited competence.
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its local administration, with the prior Mayor, Matteo Renzi, currently
serving as Prime Minister. In 2007, under Mayor Domenici, the
Municipality of Florence decided to take an energetic action against a
specific form of “street-level economic activity” that was considered a
hidden form of begging (i.e., the offer to clean cars’ windshields in the
streets), performed basically only by young Romanian Roma. After a
raging campaign by the local newspapers, the municipality adopted a
strategy based on the issuance of ordinances from the mayor, a legal tool
that would require the presence of an alleged “emergency situation” to
which the mayor may react by introducing, on his own motion, necessary
measures to “avoid serious dangers to the safety of the citizens,” without
the necessity of previous approval by the assembly of the municipality
(Consiglio comunale).34
Three different ordinances, each replacing the previous one, were
issued in a very short span of time, and prohibited the activity of
windshield cleaning. The first two ordinances even allowed for the
possibility of applying financial fines and imprisonment for violating
Article 650 of the criminal code, which penalizes breaching orders of
authority “legally given for reasons of justice, public security, or public
order, or hygiene.”35 The reason for such “repetition” of ordinances was
to keep pressure for a sufficient time notwithstanding the weakness of
the legal bases, since, for reasons that would be cumbersome to explain
in detail here, these ordinances were legally invalid and non-applicable
on the basis of clear-cut precedents and well-affirmed statutory
interpretations.36 Issuing several ordinances in a row had the simple
function of extending the time of uncertainty following the ordinance
taking effect and the discovery of its legal shortcomings. The legal
weaknesses of such instruments were so striking that the Public
Prosecutor of Florence, who in ordinary circumstances does not
intervene in local political issues, issued a public statement highlighting
the impossibility of applying the criminal sanctions recalled by the
ordinances.37 In another statement made by Mr. Domenici, the mayor at
34. The power rests upon art. 54 of the Consolidated Text on Local Municipalities. See Decreto
Legislativo 18 agosto 2000, no. 267 (It.).
35. Codice penale [C.p.] art. 650 (It.). It should be also noted that, contrary to what may happen in some states in the United States, failure to pay an administrative fine in Italy does not lead to
an escalation of measures into imprisonment or jail time.
36. See Alessandro Simoni & Fausto Giunta, Il diritto e i lavavetri: due prospettive sulle “ordinanze fiorentine,” DIRITTO, IMMIGRAZIONE E CITTADINANZA, 2007(3), at 81. Briefly, the weakness consisted in the clear absence in the circumstances of both the “emergency” and the “serious
danger to the safety of citizens” requested by art. 54 of the Decreto Legislativo 267/2000 to enable
the Mayor’s power to issue such orders.
37. Lettera 21 settembre 2007 ad oggetto denunce per articolo 650 cp nei confronti di
“lavavavetri, DIRITTO, IMMIGRAZIONE E CITTADINANZA, 2007(3), at 265.
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the time, “[t]hese are the results we hoped and wanted,”38 leaving little
doubt about the actual strategy of the municipality, which was never
aimed at enforcing the ordinances but simply at giving the local police an
immediate short-term formal basis to put pressure on the persons in the
streets by referring to the heavy sanctions mentioned in the ordinances.
The text of the ordinances and their format in the paper version are
an interesting exercise in “psychological deterrence.” For example, the
text of the first two ordinances contains a convoluted and unclear
discourse when it comes to the legal basis (with obscure references to a
number of laws and commas), and yet the plain and full text of the
sanction (imprisonment) with regard to Article 650 of the criminal code,
that was clearly not applicable in the case at hand. The third ordinance
used a different approach, using as a legal basis a provision of the
municipal police regulation in force at the time (established in 1932),
which actually refers to the prohibition of cleaning horses in the
streets.39
In practical terms, the ordinances served their intended purpose,
since the “windshield cleaners” were removed from the streets or moved
temporarily to other towns; yet, they slowly resumed their street-level
activity in Florence in the form of “ordinary” “classical” begging with a
few variations in technique and style. A part of those previously
performing this activity most likely moved to other towns or to other
activities, although empirical evidence of this can hardly be provided
considering the absence of ethnographic studies or other reliable sources.
In any case, while today at traffic lights in Florence it is possible to meet
a few “ordinary” beggars, there are no more “windshield cleaners.”
The extreme “extralegal strategy” adopted by Florence is probably
easily explained by the political context that, at the time, was likely to
reward a left-wing administration choosing a “law and order” approach
against marginal persons—a line that was otherwise monopolized by the
political right. It worked, since it was applied over a relatively short
period of time against a group of persons with extremely low awareness
of their rights, and civil society organizations that gave priority to
criticizing the administration on the media, rather than putting in place a
structured legal reaction.40
38. In Italian, risultati sperati e voluti. See Press Release, Ufficio stampa Comune di Firenze
[Press Office of Florence] (September 21, 2007) (reporting the statements of mayor Domenici at a
conference on immigration).
39. See Simoni & Giunta, supra note 36. The full text of all three ordinances can be downloaded from the website of the municipality of Florence, www.comune.fi.it, or alternatively found in
DIRITTO, IMMIGRAZIONE E CITTADINANZA, 2007(3), at 262, 263, and 266.
40. To be sure, there has been a legal initiative against the ordinances, which, however, proved
unsuccessful. Basically, the City revoked the ordinance that was being objected to before the Admin-
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However, due to its very nature, such approach could not serve as
the default strategy when the administration later faced the fact that
beggars did not disappear, but rather remained a regular and stabilized
presence in the city. As we will see in the following sections, the
pressure on marginal persons on the streets was still a priority of the
administration. However, the season of the “emergency ordinances” was
definitely over and, in 2008, the Consiglio comunale—following the
correct legal procedures—abolished the old Municipal Police Regulation
of 1932 and enacted a brand new Regulation on Urban Police.41 This
Regulation contains a provision, Article 15, with a long catalogue of
“[b]ehaviors against hygiene, decency and peaceful relations,” according
to which, “[e]xcept where a more serious criminal penalty applies,” it is
forbidden
to engage in any behavior or conduct on public streets that may be a
nuisance or a danger to other persons, and which creates an obstacle
to pedestrian or car traffic, such as laying down on sidewalks or
approaching cars on the streets, or disturbing persons in their homes
or in the proximity of hospitals; all this, including when begging,
with or without collection of signatures, or selling goods or offering
services such as cleaning or washing car’s windshields or lights.42

Clearly inspired (in an almost “ethnographic” description style) by
the past practices of “emergency ordinances,” this provision was the
basis of a “new wave” of the “war to beggars” in the shadow of the
Renaissance.43 It must be noted that the provision (which has a
substandard language quality for a normative text) does not forbid
begging per se, but just mentions it as one of the contexts in which a
“nuisance” can be produced. We now turn to the two cases that are
currently under examination by the research team.

istrative Tribunal and replaced it with a new ordinance with similar content. This move was enough
to have the proceedings discontinued.
41. Regolamento di polizia urbana–Norme per la civile convivenza in città, Delibera del consiglio comunale [Resolution of City Council], 24 luglio 2008, no. 69.
42. Id. art. 15(e) (translated from Italian).
43. Gli zingari e il Rinascimento. Vivere da Rom a Firenze, or Gypsies and the Renaissance:
To Live as a Roma in Florence, was the title of a vitriolic pamphlet of 1998 by the famous writer
Antonio Tabucchi, who criticized the treatment of Roma (in that case Roma from former Yugoslavia) living in settlements near Florence.
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III. THE CASE ON THE DATABASE
On March 19, 2014, a piece appeared in the local edition of one of
the main Italian newspapers, la Repubblica.44 The article reported that
the municipal authorities had told the author about the existence of a
database of beggars developed by the local police, containing “the
photos, number of tickets issued . . . , where they sleep, how many they
are, if they suffer from any form of disability, how much do they make
out of panhandling and why they do it” and a “mega map of all
situations, names, last names, streets where they lie and crossroads where
they stay.”45 The article also contained other statements relating to the
situation of beggars from the vice-mayor of Florence, who is the mayor
of the city today, and the then-chief of local police, who is currently the
head of legislative services for the incumbent Prime Minister.
The news appeared alarming under several points of view. First, the
collection, retention, and processing of personal data is subject to data
protection laws that provide strict requirements and limit the ability of
public bodies to harvest such data short of a legislative justification.
Second, the news was published at a time when another worrisome
activity by the local police of Florence seemed to emerge. Thanks to
connections established between the team and a few Roma beggars, it
was reported that during March 2014, and again at later stages, the local
police issued a number of tickets for the violation of Article 15 of the
aforementioned Regulation on Urban Police46 against beggars of Roma
origins. The brief handwritten notes on the tickets referred to “intruding
begging” or to “begging with obstruction to pedestrian flow.”47 In the
period of March through April 2014, at least ten tickets were issued to
three women of Roma origins, members of the same family group.
Furthermore, two more were issued during October 2014 and another
two during October 2015.
The existence of this database and the fining issue, when
considered singularly, could raise per se many legal issues, but the
context surrounding the implementation reinforced the feeling that
Florence had put in place a scheme to target beggars. Most likely, the
aim was, and still is, to remove such beggars from the public spaces at
the touristic center of the city. Furthermore, all of this should be
understood in light of the national discourse on Roma and beggars in
44. La povertà in città 220 mendicanti: ecco la mappa, LA REPUBBLICA (Mar. 19, 2014),
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2014/03/19/la-poverta-in-citta-220mendicanti-ecco.html.
45. Id.
46. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
47. The tickets are on file with the research team.
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general, which seems unequivocally directed at identifying them as a
nuisance that should be corrected or removed.
At this time, having received a formal power of attorney from the
three women, the small team from the University of Florence decided to
investigate both issues and explore the legal recourse available. This
section will first address the database, followed by the tickets.
With reference to the database, the legal basis of the initiative is the
Italian Data Protection Code (the Code),48 under which “any person is
entitled to the protection of their personal data.”49 Personal data is
defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person [i.e. the ‘data subject’], either directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to one or more factors, including an identification
number.”50 The Code also identifies a special category of “sensitive data”
that is entitled to a greater degree of protection, including “personal data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs . . . and the processing of data concerning health or
sex life.”51 The reference to the beggars’ disabilities that appeared in the
newspaper article represents sensitive data.
The Code grants a person the right to access any personal data and
allows them to be: (1) provided with the source of the data; (2) told the
purpose of the data and means by which it is collected and processed;
and (3) assured that personal data referring to her is corrected or
deleted.52
Accordingly, the team sent a formal notice to the City of Florence,
with a copy to the Italian Data Protection Authority (IDPA), requesting
confirmation as to whether the local police had collected and processed
any personal data referring to the three Roma women for the “database”
mentioned in the news article. Furthermore, the notice required, in case
of a positive answer, disclosure of the data and the origin of said data to
the women. The letter requested a response within fifteen days, in
accordance with the Code.53
The City never responded to the request or to subsequent requests.
Nor did the IDPA take any action. The City’s silence reinforced the
suspicion that there might be some truth behind the newspaper article
48. The Data Protection Code, Decreto Legislativo [Legislative Decree] 30 giugno 2003,
no. 196 (It.), was implementing a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council. See
Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (directive on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data).
49. D.Lgs. 196/2003 art. 1 (translated from Italian).
50. Id. art. 4(1)(b).
51. Id. art. 4(1)(d).
52. Id. arts. 7–8.
53. Id. art. 146(2). The letter is on file with the authors.
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regarding the existence of a database and, if so, that the City might not
have a legal basis for it.
Things only changed when the team decided to push the matter
further and began legal proceedings against the City to obtain a reply and
a disclosure of the contents of this alleged database. Thereafter, the team
filed a petition with the Court of Florence and requested the Court to
order the City to disclose any relevant material requested and that the
journalist be compelled to disclose the sources of the material collected
for his article. Finally, the petition asked that some witnesses be allowed
to testify.54
This action had two consequences. First, the City was now
obligated to file a reply at the risk of defaulting in the legal action.55
Further, due to news coverage of this petition,56 the IDPA submitted a
request to the City of Florence for the same information as had been
requested by the team.57
During the suit, the City basically referred to the reply it had
prepared for the IDPA, in which it denied the existence of the alleged
database and dismissed the news article as unsubstantiated. The City
hypothesized that the author of the article had confused two elements:
(1) the existence of a map and documents relating to beggars, but
containing no personal data; and (2) data collected by the local police
during a separate, but unspecified, investigation of a possible racket
involving Romanian citizens that allegedly led to unspecified arrests and
convictions.58
The legal action before the Court of Florence is presently pending.
Of possible interest to an American audience is that the judge in charge
of the case has denied most of the plaintiffs’ evidentiary requests and
54. The petition is on file with the authors. Readers are surely not familiar with the main differences existing between United States and Italian civil procedure. By way of extreme simplification, in Italy there is no jury, punitive damages, distinction between trial and pre-trial, nor an extensive discovery process like that governed by Rule 26 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See, e.g., GIACOMO PAILLI & NICOLO TROCKER, Italian Civil Procedure, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
ITALIAN LAW 163–83 (Alessandra De Luca & Alessandro Simoni eds., 2014); see also MAURO
CAPPELLETTI & JOSEPH PERILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY (1965).
55. However, default under Italian civil procedure does not represent either an admission of
liability nor does it entitle the party to request a default judgment be issued against the defaulting
party. Proceedings must be carried out in absentia and the plaintiff still has to prove her case. On the
history of the right to privacy in Italy, see Guido Alpa, The Protection of Privacy in Italian Law:
Case Law in a Codified Legal System, 12 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1 (1997).
56. See, e.g., Mendicanti, l’ultimatum del garante: “Spiegate quel database,” LA REPUBBLICA
FIRENZE (Dec. 29, 2014), http://firenze.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/12/29/news/mendicanti_l_
ultimatum_del_garante_spiegate_quel_database-103975924/.
57. The official letter of IDPA (file number U.0036772) to the municipality is dated December
17, 2014, and is on file with the authors.
58. The reply brief of the City is on file with the authors.
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permitted only the journalist to testify. The judge denied all discovery
requests and requests for the testimony of both the then-chief of the local
police and the Mayor.59 Further, subsequent to the journalist’s testimony
and the identification of his sources (especially those alerting him to the
existence of sensitive data), the judge denied the plaintiffs’ request to
obtain their testimony.60 Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the case,
and resisting the temptation to draw conclusions from a single example,
these events suggest that the Italian courts may not be supportive of this
type of litigation.
The idea that the pending lawsuit might be a case of public interest,
and potentially deserved different treatment, did not even surface.
Discovery, a fundamental tool in U.S. litigation, normally plays a very
limited role in the procedural law of Italian civil law systems. But even
within such narrow limits, the judge denied every request made. In a case
where the news regarding the possible existence of a database was
revealed almost by chance, and where the (alleged) “database” is entirely
within the sphere of control of the defendant, no discovery means
essentially no possibility to effectively vindicate the plaintiffs’ (and
public’s) rights relating to the protection of personal data.
Here, all the defendant needs to do is to continue to deny the
existence of any personal data. Instead, the burden of proving the
existence of the database lies with the plaintiffs, who have no realistic
prospect of discharging such a burden. Additionally, the deference given
to high-ranking officers of the government through the excuse of their
testimony, along with the refusal to require testimony from other persons
to whom the testimony of the single witness referenced (e.g., members of
the local police) makes it hard for the plaintiffs to discharge their burden
of proof.
Serious questions are thus raised as to whether Italian procedural
and evidentiary law—and the narrow interpretation given by the courts—
allows public interest litigation in cases in which the plaintiff does not
already happen to have sufficient proof of the defendant’s fault. Those
cases deserve a higher degree of attention by the courts; otherwise, rights
risk remaining simply formal declarations on the books.61
59. Being formally the defendant, Italian civil procedure forbids the Mayor to be heard as a
witness, due to the incompatibility of the position of parties and witnesses. See Codice di procedura
civile [C.p.c] arts. 117, 228, 246 (It.).
60. The minutes of the hearing are on file with the authors.
61. Everything we have described in this Part should be read against the backdrop of the Right
to Protection of Personal and Sensitive Data, a fundamental right enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts.
7–8, Dec. 7, 2000 (2000 O.J. (C 364)) [hereinafter CFREU]; Convention for the Protection of Hu-
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IV. THE CASE RELATING TO THE REGULATION ON URBAN POLICE AND
REPEATED TICKETS ISSUED AGAINST BEGGARS
Along with the information about the database, the three Roma
women provided the team with several tickets issued by the local police
in March or April of 2014 for alleged violations of Article 15 of the
Regulation on Urban Police. The tickets contained generic references to
“begging with obstruction to pedestrian flow” or to “begging in an
annoying manner.”62 The team, again after receiving a specific power of
attorney, began a dialogue—more accurately, a monologue—with the
City.
From a substantive point of view, the tickets presented several
challenges. Some of the challenges pertained to the tickets themselves
and included the vagueness of the descriptions of the conduct that led to
the alleged infractions. Furthermore, Article 15 of the Regulation on
Urban Police is also suspect because of its wording—which, in broad and
vague terms, encompasses a range of behaviors with an unclear reference
to begging—notwithstanding the fact that it is now a lawful activity.
Thus, the regulation may have a discriminatory purpose or impact.
Finally, the selective and discriminatory application of Article 15 by the
local police may also be questioned. As with the database, however, the
procedural aspects pose the greatest obstacle.
The Italian system of administrative fines is complex. Along with
civil and criminal liability, civil law systems such as Italy’s recognize a
third source of liability, “administrative liability,” that appears in state
and local regulations and ordinances concerning a variety of fields that
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
Article 7 of CFREU, titled “Respect for private and family life,” provides: “Everyone has the right to
respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.” CFREU, supra, art. 7. Article 8 of the same, titled “Protection of personal data,” provides:
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone
has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the
right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.
Id. art. 8.
Article 8 of the ECHR, titled “Right to respect for private and family life,” provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
ECHR, supra, art. 8.
62. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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range from traffic to import/export to local police. Any such administraadministrative power and regulation must be authorized by an enabling
law.63 In the present case, the legal basis is a 1981 law that provides for
the decriminalization of a number of felonies and misdemeanors and
establishes general criteria for administrative prohibitions and fines.64
Under this law, fines are issued pursuant to a two-step procedure.
First, a ticket is issued by the public body (e.g., the local police)
describing the facts, the conduct of the alleged infringer, and serving
notice to the infringer of the provisions that are deemed violated.65 The
ticket, however, is not the fine. Typical of a civil law system, the ticket,
having been drafted by a public officer, has an “increased,” or elevated
evidentiary value (“public faith”).66
Once the ticket is issued, the alleged infringer may choose among
the following: (1) doing nothing and waiting for the fine to be issued, (2)
paying a reduced fine67 within sixty days (thereby admitting liability), or
(3) disputing the ticket within thirty days.68 Crucial to the case at hand,
the law neither expressly provides, nor prohibits, judicial review during
this phase.
The second step of the procedure is a decision by the local police to
either issue a fine or to dismiss the charges, based on an analysis of the
ticket and of any defense filed. The amount of the fines are determined
by the police, and range between € 80.00 and € 500.00, as allowed by the
Regulation on Urban Police, and within the boundaries set by the
63. For a panoramic view on the Italian system of administrative law, old but gold, see G. Miele, G. Cotzi & D. Falconi, Italian Administrative Law, 3 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 421 (1954). See also
Daria de Pretis, Italian Administrative Law Under the Influence of European Law, 1 IT. J. PUB. L. 6
(2010).
64. Legge di depenalizzazione [Decriminalization Law], 24 novembre 1981, n. 689 (It.).
65. Not all administrative fines are based on this law, which, nonetheless, provides the general
principle in the field. One notable example is traffic tickets which are based on a legislative decree
and do not require the two-step procedure described in the text: the ticket issued by the police for a
violation of traffic law is both a notice of violation and an injunction to pay the fine. See Decreto
Legislativo, 30 aprile 1992, n. 285 (It.).
66. Such increased evidentiary value is based on a theory of “public faith” for statements made
by a public officer. See Codice civile [C.c] arts. 2699–2700. Not all that is stated is covered by an
increased evidentiary value. A difference is usually made between extrinsic and intrinsic elements.
Only extrinsic elements, what a public officer says happened and any third party statements given to
the officer, are covered. Other elements, such as the validity of the content of third party statements,
may be freely evaluated by the judge. “Public faith” means that one cannot object or bring adverse
evidence disputing the facts as reported by the public officer or asserting that the alleged infringer
did not perform the cited act. The only recourse is to bring special and cumbersome proceedings
alleging forgery of the ticket. Through forgery proceedings known as querela di falso, it can be objected that the ticket has been materially forged or that its content has been falsely reported (and
which may also lead to criminal proceedings being brought against the forger).
67. The reduced fine is equal to twice the minimum fine, in this case € 160.00. See
L. n. 689/1981 art. 16.
68. Id. art. 18.
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previously mentioned law no. 689 of 1981.69 In the case at hand, the
team timely filed statements of defense on behalf of the three women
against all sets of tickets arising from a number of occasions.70 The City
never replied to any of these defenses, nor made any decision on whether
to issue the fine or dismiss the charges. Two years have passed since the
date of the first ticket, and the tickets are still in limbo. The explanation
is probably that the real purpose the City and local police pursue when
issuing such tickets against the beggars is not to collect a fine or enforce
a prohibition on a certain conduct, but rather—as already seen in the
context of the “emergency ordinances”—to exercise a de facto physical
power over the persons (beggars) with the goal of removing them from
the city center. Once the beggars have left their place of begging (only to
return later, often within a few hours or days), the City loses interest.
Realizing that they will never be able to collect fines from indigents, the
authorities are unconcerned with completing the administrative
procedures and performing the actual issuance of fines.
It should also be noted that beggars typically have limited resources
and seldom present a statement of defense against a police ticket. In the
case at hand, where assistance was provided by the team, the City may
have an additional reason for inaction on the tickets. As explained below
in greater detail, the tickets are in a legal state where no judicial review is
allowed. When—or if—the City makes a decision on the tickets, there
will be consequences: if the City actually issues fines, the infringers
(here, the three Roma women) will be entitled to challenge the fines
before a court and to present all their arguments. Judging from the fact
that these three women are represented by attorneys and have already
brought an action on the database, the City may reasonably expect that
such a challenge would be filed. In such a forum, the fines, the local
police’s conduct and the Regulation on Urban Police would all be subject
to judicial review, albeit with certain limitations,71 and likely result in
negative consequences for the City’s strategy against beggars.
Alternatively, in the unlikely event that the City accepted the
arguments presented in the statements of defense and dropped the
69. L. n. 689/1981 art. 10.
70. The statements of defense were filed twice in March 2014, once in November 2014, and
again in November 2015.
71. According to L. n. 689/1981, the competent judge to hear challenges against fines is the
ordinary judge. Such a judge does not have the power to strike down an illegal administrative act,
but is only entitled to adjudicate on its lawfulness for the purposes of deciding the challenge: in this
sense the judge may declare that the regulation is not valid, but such declaration would only have
effect for the purposes of annulling the challenged fines. Jurisdiction over Art. 15, which the Regulation struck down, would lie with the Administrative Tribunal, but—for technical reasons that are
beyond the scope of this short contribution—it is not possible to bring such a challenge. It is another
legal loophole, in addition to that described in the text.
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charges, it might induce the City and the local police to modify their bebehavior and, possibly, to stimulate a debate on the lawfulness of the
Regulation on Urban Police itself. The City would be admitting to
wrongdoing and that should be subject to consequences.
Instead of choosing one of these two roads, neither of which is
particularly appealing or risk-free, the City simply chose the safest
alternative: do nothing and avoid both judicial review and an admission
of wrongdoing. The Italian legal system apparently allows the City to do
so and deprives the three women of their right to be heard and to
challenge the tickets and the local police conduct.
To analyze this point, another jump into the complexities of the
Italian system is required. Normally, all public bodies are required to
conclude administrative procedures within a time limit as specified by
the law. If no specific time limit is set by a law, the default term is thirty
days.72 After the term has expired, if no special rules apply,73 the failure
to issue an act or decision concluding the administrative procedure is
considered unlawful.74 Against such “unlawful silence,” any interested
party may file a petition before the Regional Administrative Tribunal for
an order to the public body to issue an explicit decision.
The catch is that when a procedure concerning a fine under the law
no. 689 of 1981 is involved, this mechanism does not apply. The law is
silent on the matter, and in principle the thirty-day limit of Article 2
should apply. But courts are constant in stating that, in the context of
fines, the law of 1981 lays down a comprehensive body of rules
displacing the law no. 241 of 1990.75 The courts also regularly hold that
thirty days is too short to allow the public body to make a decision and
apply the only other time limit found in the law no. 689 of 1981;
specifically the five year statute of limitation housed under Article 28.76
This means that any public body (here, the City of Florence) has five
years to make a decision on whether to issue a fine based on the ticket. In
the abstract, an alleged infringer would have to wait five years in order to
determine whether the charges from the ticket would actually turn into a
fine or be dismissed. During this period, the alleged infringer lives under
72. Legge 7 agosto 1990, n. 241 art. 2 (It.).
73. There are cases in which silence by a public body may either mean approval or rejection of
an application. These cases are provided for by the law, and normally silence has no specific meaning. See Vera Parisio, The Italian Administrative Procedure Act and Public Authorities’ Silence, 36
HAMLINE L. REV. 3 (2013).
74. L. n. 241/1990 art. 2 (It.).
75. See, e.g., TAR Lazio, Roma [Regional Administrative Tribunal], sez. II, 9 giugno 2011,
n. 5146, Foro amm. (It.); Cass. civ. [Italian Supreme Court], sez. V, 11 giugno 2010, n. 14104,
Giust. civ. mass. 2010, 6, 901 (It.).
76. See, e.g., Cass. civ., sez. II, 23 gennaio 2007, n. 1401, Guida al diritto 2007, 18, 77; Cass.
civ., sez. un., 27 aprile 2006, n. 9591, Giust. civ. mass. 2006, 4; Foro amm. CDS 2006, 7–8, 2144.
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the “threat” that the public body could issue a fine. If it were to issue
such a fine, then the alleged infringer would only have thirty days from
the day it has been served upon her to challenge the fine.77
To make things worse, another line of established case law
excludes the possibility for an alleged infringer to challenge the fine and
seek judicial review of the local police ticket while the five year term is
pending. According to the Italian Supreme Court, before the actual fine
is issued, because no breach of a person’s rights has taken place, the
alleged infringer has no “interest” to bring an action or to seek judicial
review.78
Neither line of cases is exempt from critique, but the consequence
of reading them together is that on one side, the City is under no
obligation to make a decision on whether or not to issue a fine—it may
simply let the time lapse until the five year statute of limitation runs out,
after which the entire matter becomes moot. On the other side, the
alleged infringers—the three Roma women—cannot seek judicial review
against the local police ticket, the local police conduct, or challenge the
legality of the Regulation on Urban Police, until a fine is issued, which
most likely will never occur. As a result, the City and the local police can
continue removing beggars from the city center, without the possibility
of bringing this conduct under judicial scrutiny.
Luckily, this is not the whole story. Even if no ordinary or
administrative court is available in Italy to hear the pleas of the
Florentine beggars, this does not mean that there are no other avenues.
Geographically adapting the old saying, “There will be a judge in
Strasbourg,”79 the legal loophole that prevents the Roma beggars from
challenging the conduct of the local police before an Italian judge may
entitle the three women to claim a violation of their right to access a
court as provided by Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human
Rights.80 Since the famous and early decision in Golder,81 the European
77. Decreto Legislativo 1 settembre 2011, n. 150 art. 6 (It.).
78. See Cass., sez. lav., 23 aprile 2012, n. 6344 (It.), and Cass., sez. un., 16 dicembre 2008,
n. 29349 (It.), where “interest” is used in a technical sense, Codice di procedura civile [C.p.c] art.
100.
79. “There will be a judge in Berlin” is an old saying referring to the existence of an independent judge, allegedly pronounced by a German miller in the eighteenth century facing the threat of
expropriation addressed to him by the emperor Frederick the Great.
80. Art. 6(1) states:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly
but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of
morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of
juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent
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Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has repeatedly stated that every person
has the right of access to court. Furthermore, this right entails that the
state cannot restrict or eliminate judicial review in certain fields or for
certain classes of individuals.82 In the court’s view, “[f]or the right of
access to be effective, an individual must have a clear, practical
opportunity to challenge an act that is an interference with his rights.”83
One, perhaps the sole, option that may be pursued in this case, is to
petition the Strasbourg Court for a declaration that the women’s right of
access to the court for judicial review of the tickets has been violated, as
well as shed light on local police behavior and on the Regulation on
Urban Police. Additionally, the court might possibly indicate measures
that the State should adopt to remedy such violations.
CONCLUSION
As we have shown, notwithstanding the decriminalization of adult
begging, beggars are still perceived by the community as a nuisance that
should be removed. Under pressure from its constituencies, local
municipalities have passed a number of measures targeting beggars and
their activities. Despite their generally unsound legal bases, all these
measures empower the local police to effectively push beggars away
from the public space. While some of these measures have been
successfully challenged during the years, there is a wide gap between
beggars and access to justice.
We are trying to fill this gap, starting with an experiment in
Florence, and challenge these practices as discriminatory and against
basic rule of law principles. In our path, however, we are encountering
several obstacles. The case on the database showed two of them:
(1) Italian judges, who often act as high-level bureaucrats, may not be
culturally inclined to support public interest litigation; and (2) there are
procedural limitations, particularly relating to the collection of evidence
and discovery, that may effectively bar any realistic attempt to bring and
win a particular case. The matter relating to tickets shows a different set
of obstacles: (1) a legal loophole that prevents judicial review of the
tickets, and, through that, (2) the behavior of the local police and the
Regulation on Urban Police.
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity
would prejudice the interests of justice.
ECHR, supra note 61.
81. Golder v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 524 (1975).
82. Among the many, notable decisions, we highlight the famous Airey v Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 305 (1979), where the court stated that access to court must be substantial, not merely formal,
i.e., that indigents must be allowed to have legal aid.
83. Bellet v. France, App. No. 23805/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at ¶ 36 (1995).
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We are committed to overcoming these obstacles and limitations
and to seeking ways or alternatives to ensure that the rule of law is
upheld and potentially discriminatory practices and regulations are
subjected to judicial scrutiny. We pledge, in future research, to carry out
statistical studies to gain a better and more accurate picture of the
phenomenon and of its impact, as well as to expand the scope of our
analysis beyond the city of Florence to other Italian cities, and to the
regulation and practices relating to begging. Our ultimate goal being to
bridge the distance between Roma, beggars, and the rule of law,
furthering the Access to Justice movement that was, long ago, very
vibrant in Florence.84

84. We are referring here to the monumental work of the late Mauro Cappelletti, Professor of
Law at the University of Florence, the European University Institute, and Stanford University. See
generally ACCESS TO JUSTICE (M. Cappelletti et al. eds., 1978).

